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THE CASE FOR MODEST
CONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTALISM
WHY LAW MATTERS. By Alon Harel. 1 Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014. Pp. xii + 240. $65.00 (cloth).
Yossi Nehushtan
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INTRODUCTION
"This fascinating volume offers arguments that are both
significant and surprising ... a major work from a leading writer,
it will force many to re-think why and how law matters" (p. viii).
The editors of the Oxford Legal Philosophy book series, just
quoted, got it right. Harel's book is a constitutional and
philosophical treat. It is innovative and thought-provoking (much
like Harel's previous work on related issues). It forces the reader
to re-think major and common assumptions about the law and
especially about constitutional procedures and institutions. The
fact that I disagree with many of Harel's arguments-and with his
main thesis- is marginal to the pleasure of reading the book and
to the great challenge that it poses to those who do not share its
main argument. This argument, in short, is that various legal and
political institutions and procedures (constitutions and judicial
review, for example) are desirable as such, i.e. regardless of their
ability to facilitate the realization of valuable ends and of their
prospects to realize such ends.
Interestingly, that was not Harel's original position, which
was the exact opposite of the view presented in the book.
According to Harel's original position, the desirability of
constitutional directives hinges on the question of whether such
directives are likely to guide the state or individual agents to act
as they ought to. Accordingly, the desirability of judicial review
and its optimal scope hinges exclusively on the question of
1. Phillip and Estelle Mizock Chair in Administrative and Criminal Law, The
Hebrew University.
2. Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of the MAin Human Rights, Globalisation and
Justice, School of Law, Keele University, U.K.
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whether judicial review is conductive to reaching the right
decision or acting in accordance with reason.
Had Hare] chosen to write a book that established these
arguments, this review would have been much shorter and less
skeptical. However, Harel changed his views and now the book
examines various legal and political institutions and procedures
and argues that the desirability of these institutions and
procedures is not contingent and does not hinge on the
prospects that these institutions are conductive to the
realization of valuable ends. Instead, various legal institutions
and legal procedures that arc often perceived as a contingent
means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends matter as
such (p. 2).

I will start by raising doubts as to whether Harel does make
a case for anti-instrumentalism with regard to some constitutional
procedures and institutions. I will then question Harel's noninstrumentalist approach with regard to constitutionalism and
judicial review and will conclude with a short defense of modest
constitutional instrumentalism. I will not discuss Harel's
application of his general non-instrumentalist approach to the
specific issues of "rights" and "privatization."

1. DOES HAREL MAKE A CASE FOR NONINSTRUMENTALIST CONSTITUTIONJ\LISM?
In the introduction to the book, Harel makes it clear that he
does not argue that instrumental justifications necessarily fail and
that he does not make a general argument against applying
instrumental justifications in legal or political theory. He does
argue that instrumental justifications that rest exclusively on
contingencies are not free of difficulties. He also argues that with
regard to the examples presented in the book, non-instrumental
justifications are sound (p. 5). His more specific arguments later
on imply that with regard to the examples presented in the book,
non-instrumental justifications are not merely sound, but also
supenor.
At this point, we face a preliminary, conceptual difficulty.
Throughout the book, Harel establishes his argument that
constitutional institutions and procedures are important as such
and that they have intrinsic value, in the sense that their
desirability is not contingent and does not hinge on the prospects
that these institutions are conductive to the realization of valuable
ends. It is not always clear, however, to which of the possible
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meanings of "intrinsic value" Harel refers-and whether all these
meanings accurately explain what having "intrinsic value"
actually means. We can find in the book at least four possible
meanings of being "valuable as such" or for having "intrinsic
value."
Intrinsic value type 1 can be expressed as: "X is always good
regardless of the consequences." For example, "autonomous
decisions are always valuable regardless of the content of such
decisions." This is probably the strongest, "purest" claim for
something being valuable "as such." Some may claim that this is
the only possible meaning of being "valuable as such."
Intrinsic value type 2 can be expressed as: "X always brings
about better consequences than the alternatives." For example,
"autonomous decisions are always superior in terms of their
content to non-autonomous decisions." This is a mixed argument
with both instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist foundations
(with the former being more dominant).
Intrinsic value type 3 could be described as: "X is always
preferable, other things being equal." For example, "good
decisions have added value if they are autonomous- and bad
autonomous decisions have more value than bad nonautonomous decisions." This is a mild claim for something being
valuable as such.
Intrinsic value type 4 is: "X is a necessary (yet not sufficient)
prerequisite for doing good." For example, "being autonomous is
a necessary (yet not sufficient) prerequisite for making good
decisions." This argument (much like type 2) also has
instrumentalist foundations as our concern here is the
consequences of X (being autonomous), which is making the right
decisions. In that respect, X is merely a means to an end, at least
in part.
It is evident that different types of meaning of ''intrinsic
value" or "being valuable as such" require different justifications
or supporting arguments. Also, some types require more evidence
or more powerful arguments in order to be convincing with regard
to a particular X. In any event, it is clear that one can argue that
X is valuable "as such" in many different ways. While reading
Harel's arguments for different constitutional procedures and
arguments being valuable "as such," one can admire their clarity
and novelty. Concerns, however, may be raised with regard to
their consistency. More accurately, I suspect that throughout the
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book Harel argues for different types of meaning being "valuable
as such" without explicitly differentiating between these types.
For example, Harel argues that the desirability of various
legal and political institutions and procedures "is not contingent
and does not hinge on the prospects that these institutions are
conductive to the realization of valuable ends. Instead, various
legal institutions and legal procedures that are often perceived as
a contingent means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends
matter as such" (p. 2). This is clearly an "intrinsic value" argument
of type 1 ("X is always good regardless of the consequences").
However, Harel also argues that the book "sides with those who
believe that sometimes the justness or correctness of a decision
depends on the institution making the decision and/or on the
procedure by which the decision came about" (p. 2); that "legal
institutions and procedures are often not mere contingent
instruments to realize valuable ends; they are often necessary
components of a just society" (p. 3); and, more specifically, that
"constitutional entrenchment of rights is therefore a necessary
precondition for freedom rather than merely a contingent
instrument for protecting freedom" (p. 7). These are intrinsic
value statements of type 4 ("X is a necessary yet not sufficient
prerequisite for doing good").
Harel also suggests that "constitutions as well as judicial
review are not mere instruments to guarantee good, just or
coherent decisions; they are valuable for other reasons and their
value does not depend only or primarily on the degree to which
they contribute to the substantive merit of the resulting legislation
or executive decision" (p. 133). Here Harel acknowledges that
constitutions as well as judicial review are valuable also because
and in so far as they guarantee good and just decisions. This is a
modest argument according to which constitutions and judicial
review are valuable both "as such" and as long as they contribute
to the substantive merit of the resulting legislation or executive
decision. It is quite clear that here Harel does not argue that
constitutions and judicial review are always valuable regardless of
the consequences (intrinsic value argument type 1) or that they
are a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for doing good
(intrinsic value type 4). It is not clear, however, whether Harel
argues that constitutions and judicial review will always bring
about better consequences than the alternative (no constitution
or judicial review), which would in fact be an intrinsic value
argument of type 2; or whether he argues that constitutions and
judicial review are always preferable "other things being equal"
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(i.e., it is better to have them even when we get the same results
without having them), which would be intrinsic value argument
type 3.
Another concern regarding Harel's commitment to noninstrumentalism arises from the following. Harel departs from
those who argue that first we need to identify the "right" or
correct decision- and then to identify the institution or procedure
that is most likely to get it right. Instead, Harel argues that
"sometimes the justness or correctness of a decision depends on
the institution making the decision and/or on the procedure by
which the decision came about" (p. 2). He also argues that "there
is a close (or strong) affinity between legal and political
institutions and procedures on the one hand and the desirable
goals or values, such that the latter can, even in principle, be
realised only by establishing the former" (p. 5). This is, again, an
argument of intrinsic value type 4 (X is a necessary yet not
sufficient prerequisite for doing good). As such it has strong
instrumentalist foundations. Harel argues that sometimes (only?)
certain institutions or procedures are likely to get certain
decisions right and therefore these institutions are the ones that
should make these decisions. In other words, even according to
Harel, legal institutions and legal procedures are not in fact
valuable as such. They are only valuable because with regard to
certain decisions they are likely (or more likely?) to get it right. If
Harel thinks that certain institutions and procedures will always
get it right or if he thinks that it is inevitable that they would get
it right-we are getting slightly closer to a stronger, yet not pure,
"valuable as such" argument. If Harel thinks that certain
institutions and procedures are preferable and valuable as suchregardless of their being able to get it right or of their being a
necessary condition for getting it right-then we would have a
truly pure and powerful non-instrumentalist argument. But if
certain institutions and procedures are formed in order to
increase the likelihood that they would get it right-or are formed
as a necessary but not sufficient condition for getting it rightthen these institutions and procedures are not valuable as such.
They are only valuable if they are being used as instruments for
getting it right.
Up to now I have raised a few concerns about the true nature
of Harel's general non-instrumentalist approach (within the
context of constitutional theory). I will now move to discuss in
more detail Harel's critique of constitutional instrumentalism
within the context of constitutionalism and judicial review.
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CONSTITUTIONS MATTER

A. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF RIGHTS- AND THE
DUTY TO PROTECT RIGHTS

The title of part III of Harel's book is "Why Constitutions
Matter: The Case for Robust Constitutionalism." Here Harel
makes a few bold and fascinating arguments. His tnain argument
is that "the constitutional entrenchment of pre-existing moral or
political rights is valuable, independently of whether such an
entrenchment is conductive to the protection of these rights" (p.
7), and that
the value of binding constitutionalism is grounded not in its
likely contingent effect or consequences, e.g., better protection
of rights; hut rather in the fact that constitutional entrenchment
of rights constitutes public recognition that the protection of
rights is the state's duty rather than a mere discretionary
gesture on its part (pp. 7, 134).

To clarify this point Harel adds that "in the absence of
binding constitutional directives, a state which protects a right can
be analogized to a debtor who gives what he owes to his lender
but insists that his act is a charitable donation rather than a
repayment of a debt" (pp. 7, 172-173).
Harel suggests a rigid dichotomy: rights are protected either
by duty-based decisions or by discretionary decisions (pp. 133,
150). Moreover, Harel differentiates between moral or political
duties on the one hand and constitutional duties on the other.
Duty-based decisions, according to Harel, result from (and
perhaps only from) entrenching rights in a constitution. Harel
writes that "in the absence of constitutional entrenchment,
conformity of the legislature with its moral/political duties is not
sufficient as it does not represent sufficient recognition or
acknowledgement of the state's duties. The effective protection of
the duties in such a case can naturally be attributed to the
legislature's judgments or inclinations and not necessarily to its
duties" (p. 172).
I suspect that Harel is a bit too quick in suggesting the
dichotomy between protecting rights by duty-based decisions
(which must be based on constitutionally entrenched rights) and
protecting rights by discretionary decisions. He also accords too
much weight to the distinction between moral or political duties
and constitutional duties (by arguing that only the latter represent
sufficient recognition or acknowledgement of the state's duties).
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Lastly, a third type of duties-legal duties-which are not
constitutional duties in the sense that they are not entrenched in
a constitution, is ignored to some extent.
What are the implications of differentiating between moral
duties, legal duties and constitutional duties, and how does this
differentiation relate to the distinction between duty-based
decisions
and
discretionary
decisions?
Constitutional
entrenchment of rights always creates a legal duty (but not
necessarily moral duty) to protect these rights. Yet, the absence
of constitutional entrenchment of rights does not rule out the
state's acknowledgment of a moral and/or legal duty to protect
these rights. The state-through its agents-has to protect rights
as long as the state's laws compel its agents to do so. The state will
protect rights if the state acknowledges a moral duty to do so. The
moral duty to protect rights is independent of such rights
incorporated into any legal norm, be that an ordinary statute or a
constitution. Moreover, moral duties, when they are publicly
acknowledged and deeply rooted in the society's traditions,
conventions, customs and practices, does represent sufficient
recognition or acknowledgement of the state's duties. The
effective protection of the duties in such a case cannot be
attributed to the legislature's mere judgments or inclinations, but
rather to its publicly and politically binding moral duties. Thus,
acts of grace or charity are not the only alternatives to
constitutional entrenchment of rights, and constitutional
entrenchment of rights is not the only source of duty for
protecting such rights (both objectively- and from the point of
view of the state itself).
Harel may argue that the state (or the legislature)
acknowledges its duty to protect rights only when these rights are
constitutionally entrenched, i.e., only when these rights are
incorporated into an entrenched constitution rather than included
in an "ordinary" statute-or that the sense of duty is stronger in
the former. Neither argument is convincing. It is true that the
legislature can easily change its ordinary statutes whereas an
entrenched constitution is harder to amend. But the state's organs
are legally subject to the state's ordinary statutes and constitution
alike- until they are changed. The fact that changing the
constitution is more difficult than changing ordinary statutes is of
little importance here.
Harel does agree that there are moral rights, human rights or
natural rights which are independent of judgments or preferences
of the legislature or "the people." These rights, Harel argues,
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should be constitutionally entrenched because they create "public
recognition that the protection of rights is the state's duty rather
than a mere discretionary gesture on its part" (p. 7). Here we
could ask why this sense of duty is valuable as such- and whether
it is valuable at all. Harel explicitly argues that the value in
constitutional entrenchment of rights does not result from its
being the best way to properly protect rights. Rather, it results
from the recognition of the duty it imposes on the state to protect
rights. In order to eliminate the "actual protection of rights"
factor let us assume (as Harel also does) two states that equally
protect human rights. State A protects human rights reluctantly
and grudgingly-and only because its agents acknowledge that
they are under a legal-constitutional duty to protect rights. The
state's agents protect rights only or mostly because they fear that
if they do not their decisions will be overturned by courts
exercising judicial review or be condemned by others, either other
states' agents or the public. State B protects human rights even
though these rights are not constitutionally entrenched. It does so
because it acknowledges its moral duty to protect rights. Is state
A more virtuous than state B? Is there inherent value in acting in
a certain way only because one is under a legal duty to do so?
From the point of view of rights-holders, would they prefer their
rights to be protected by state agents who only protect rights
because they are under a legal-constitutional duty to do so, or
would they prefer their rights to be protected by state agents who
protect rights because they acknowledge that they are under a
moral duty to do so? (Here, again, we have to assume that both
states protect rights to the same extent).
When a person's rights are protected only because others are
under a legal duty to do so, that person is being tolerated rather
than respected as an equal or as a rights-holder. \Vhen there are
compelling moral reasons to acknowledge a person's moral right,
protecting that right merely because the law compels one to do so
may even insult the right-holder, making him feel tolerated rather
than truly respected or accepted. A person is truly respected and
accepted as an equal and as a rights-holder when his rights are
respected, regardless of a legal duty to do so.
It can be argued, of course, that we should not trust state
agents to properly protect rights in the absence of a legalconstitutional duty to do so-and that legal duties complement
moral duties to protect rights and hence are necessary for a better
protection of rights. This may be true but this is not what Harel is
arguing. Harel argues that the value of binding constitutionalism
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is grounded not in its likely contingent effect or consequences,
such as a better protection of rights. Rather, it is grounded in the
fact that constitutional entrenchment of rights constitutes public
recognition that the protection of rights is the state's duty rather
than a mere discretionary gesture on its part. My response thus
far was that (a) protection of rights can be the state's legal and
moral duty in the absence of "binding constitutionalism," or, in
other words, protecting rights by exercising discretion is not the
only alternative to binding constitutionalism; and (b) there is no
inherent value in protecting rights merely out of a legalconstitutional duty.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF RIGHTS-AND
BEING AT THE MERCY OF THE RULER

Harel insists that a state in which the legislature protects
rights because it is bound by constitutional duties is superior to a
state in which the legislature protects rights to the same extent but
in the absence of such duties. This is so, Hare) argues, because in
the latter case individuals live at the mercy of the legislature-i.e.,
their rights depend on the legislature's inclination (p. 148). Here
Harel does not explicitly argue that living at the mercy of the
legislature may result in uncertainty, a less stable protection of
rights or a lesser protection of rights-as this will be an
instrumentalist argument of the kind that Harel rejects. But he
does write that the entrenchment of constitutional duties is
essential to the protection of freedom. Citizens are freer in a
society in which such rights are recognized as duties rather than
resulting from the mere judgments or inclinations of legislatures.
This is because in such a society citizens do not live at the mercy
of their legislature and are not subject to its judgments or
preferences (p. 149). Harel adds that citizens in a state in which
rights are not constitutionally entrenched are subject "to the risk
of a potential shift in the legislature's judgments or inclinations"
(p. 151), and that they are subject to the arbitrary sway and
potentially capricious will of the legislature.
If the importance and value of the entrenchment of
constitutional rights do not only lie in its being a form of
"symbolic" public recognition that the protection of rights is the
state's duty (and that may be a non-instrumentalist argument)but also on its being a means to an end (making the citizens freer
and enhancing certainty and stability in terms of the extent to
which rights are protected), then Harel is actually suggesting a
very
convincing
yet
instrumentalist
argument
for
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constitutionalism. Harel answers this difficulty by endorsing a
"republican understanding of freedom," according to which to be
free does not only mean not being coerced, but also not living "at
the mercy of the potential violator's inclinations" (p. 171).
Moreover, he argues that "even if the citizens' rights are not
better (or at least are equally) protected by constitutionally
entrenching moral or political norms, citizens are freer under such
a scheme as they are not subject to the judgments or inclinations
of the legislature" (p. 172). This is a more subtle argument but is
still not completely non-instrumentalist. Firstly, not being at the
mercy of a potential violator's inclination and not being subject to
the judgments or inclinations of the legislature is only valuable
when the legislature or the executive are likely to violate rights.
Put differently, not being at the mercy of the ruler is not valuable
"as such" but as a means to an end-as a means to secure a proper
protection of rights from unexpected, arbitrary or unjust
violation. It is a defense mechanism against making things worse
and it is only valuable when it actually prevents things from
getting worse or is likely to do so. Therefore, Harel may be right
by arguing that even if the citizens' rights are not better (or at least
are equally) protected by constitutionally entrenching moral or
political norms, entrenching rights is preferable. This is an "all
other things being equal" argument (intrinsic value type 3), and,
as such, it is convincing. But it would be odd to argue, in a purely
non-instrumentalist way, that entrenching rights is always
preferable (as it makes citizens freer) -even if it results in a lesser
protection of rights or cannot prevent lesser protection of rights
in a certain state at a certain time.
Secondly, and as I noted earlier, the state's organs are legally
subject to the state's ordinary statutes and constitution alikeuntil either of the latter is changed. Constitutions, much like
ordinary statutes, can be changed-and are changed. In that
respect, citizens are still at the mercy of those who are authorized
to change the constitution and are subject to their judgments and
inclinations. Harel stresses that freedom, properly understood, is
in fact "non-domination" (p. 174), and that "·domination is
understood in terms of the potential for arbitrary interference"
(p. 174). As constitutions, much like ordinary laws, can be
changed on an arbitrary basis and can be interpreted arbitrarily,
citizens are still at the mercy of the ruler. Some constitutions are
indeed harder to change than "ordinary" statutes, but this is a
matter of degree, not of principle. It seems that throughout his
discussion Harel assumes that a constitution is an "external"
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constraint, as if a third party creates it and constrains the state or
the legislature by it, whereas the constitution can be created and
often is amended, by the same "rulers" who are both subject to it
and compel it on "the people." Thus, constitutionalism in and of
itself does not make the citizens free or freer in terms of being free
from domination. A constitution merely constrains some state
agents in a certain way until other state agents (or sometimes the
same agents) decide to amend it at their will.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF RIGHTS
NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR FREEDOM

As A

As noted above, Harel argues that constitutional
entrenchment of rights is a necessary precondition for freedom
rather than a mere contingent instrument for protecting freedom
(pp. 7, 150). Two further comments can be made here.
Firstly, we should note that this is a slightly different
argument than the previous one, described above. According to
Harel's previous argument, constitutional entrenchment of rights
is valuable regardless of its consequences, i.e., regardless of the
likelihood that it will better protect rights. According to the
current argument, constitutional entrenchment of rights is
valuable because it is a necessary precondition for freedom, i.e.,
because of its desired (potential) consequences. This brings us
back to the distinction between intrinsic value type 1 (X is always
good regardless of the consequences) and type 4 (X is a necessary
yet not sufficient prerequisite for doing good).
Secondly, it is important to note that Harel's argument (that
the constitutional entrenchment of rights is a necessary
precondition for freedom) can only be true if we understand the
term "freedom" in its "republican," non-intuitive meaning, i.e.,
"freedom" not as not being coerced to do X or prevented from
doing Y, but rather freedom as not living "at the mercy of the
ruler." However, most people presumably do not perceive the
term "freedom" that way, and that alone undermines Harel's
argument, as Harel aims to accurately describe genuine
sentiments that "the people" have for their constitution. If we
perceive freedom as most people (and constitutions) normally do,
i.e., as not being coerced to do X or prevented from doing Y, then
the argument that constitutional entrenchment of rights is a
necessary precondition for freedom can be easily disputed. There
are examples of democratic states protecting their citizens' rights
in a satisfactory way without constitutionally entrenched rights
(e.g., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand-and I am aware of
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the significant constitutional differences between these three
states). Having a (proper) Bill of Rights may increase the
likelihood of protecting freedom more effectively. Having a Bill
of Rights is not, however, a "necessary precondition for freedom,"
as freedom can be effectively and sufficiently protected by goodhearted legislatures and administrators and by political
conventions in the absence of a constitution.
D. THE TRUE PASSION FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM
Harel's argument against constitutional instrumentalism is
that it distorts what is really valuable about constitutionalism,
namely, the sense that "constitutions are a necessary (rather than
contingent) feature of a just or legitimate society" (p. 139). Harel
argues that the instrumental value of the constitution, even if it
could be established, fails to be attentive to the real reasons
underlying the passion for constitutionalism. It mlay be the case
that instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism fail to be
attentive to the reasons underlying the passion of noninstrumentalists for constitutionalism. It does not have to be the
case that instrumentalist arguments fail to reflect the "real"
reasons for constitutionalism, i.e., reasons that are sincerely held
by scholars, politicians and "the people." One interesting example
that is painfully familiar to Harel and myself may help in clarifying
this claim.
The example is taken from Israel's unique constitutional
history. Israel does not have a unified and codified constitution.
Until 1992, it had nine "Basic Laws," most of which dealt with
"constitutional subjects," none of which had normative
superiority over "regular laws." The struggle in Israel to enact a
constitution has always been identified with liberal politicians and
academics. The struggle led to the enactment of two new Basic
Laws in 1992, and to a few subsequent Supreme Court decisions
that stated that all "Basic Laws" are in fact constitutional legal
norms which are normatively superior to "regular laws." So, at
present, Israel does have a set of Basic Laws that, when put
together, are a "partial constitution." Israel still does not have a
complete and unified constitution- and especially not a complete
and unified Bill of Rights. Since the early 1990s, there has been an
ongoing academic, political and public struggle for ending this
constitutional anomaly and for enacting a "proper"
comprehensive and unified constitution. This struggle, which was
led by liberals and human rights advocates, has slowly faded after
the campaigners realized that the Israeli Parliament (which has
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the authority to enact a constitution) as well as the Israeli
Government are heavily dominated- and will probably be
dominated for the next few decades- by right-wing nationalist
parties. In the Israeli parliamentary system, both "regular laws"
and constitutional legal norms are enacted by Parliament and
through the ordinary legislative procedure. For the campaigners,
this means that should a new and comprehensive constitution be
enacted in Israel, it will probably be a horrendous one. It will
constitutionally entrench nationalistic, religious, "nondemocratic," and possibly also racist norms. Many of the liberals
who fought for a "constitution for Israel" now think it is better for
Israel's fragile democracy not to have a constitution than to have
an intolerable one that will be interpreted and enforced by the
new generation of Supreme Court judges, some of whom are too
fearful of the new generation of anti-democratic politicians or are
sympathetic to their views. This is constitutional instrumentalism
at its best. It reflects a genuine approach according to which a
constitution is only or mostly valuable if it enhances the proper
protection given to democracy and human rights. It demonstrates
that the real reasons underlying the passion for constitutionalism
is protecting human rights and democratic principles and that
constitutions are not necessarily perceived as "valuable as such."
If there are good reasons to assume that under certain
circumstances constitutionalism will fail to protect human rights
and democratic principles-or might put them in greater
danger- the passion for constitutionalism is significantly or
completely diminished- and rightly so.
3. IS THERE A NON-INSTRUMENTALIST ARGUMENT
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -AND DO WE NEED ONE?
I will discuss Harel's arguments concerning judicial review in
the following order: I will first discuss the relation between
judicial review and the right to a hearing, and will refute the
argument that the right to a hearing provides non-instrumentalist
justification for judicial review. I will then discuss Harel's implied
suggestion for "judicial review without courts." This will be
followed by criticizing common views (and Hare I's novel view) on
the implications of the (alleged?) contrast between judicial review
and democratic legitimacy. It should be noted that Harel limits
the discussion to "constitutional" judicial review (i.e., review of
legislation) and does not aim to apply his arguments to
"administrative" judicial review (review of decisions of the
executive). This is important as even if Harel succeeds in making
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his case for a non-instrumentalist justification for judicial review,
the argument is only applied to the relatively exceptional cases
when the court invalidates legislation rather than to the far more
common cases in which administrative decisions are invalidated.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW- AND THE RIGHT TO

A. HEARING

According to Harel, judicial review is desirable because it
protects the right to a hearing. More specifically, he argues that
"the justification for judicial review is grounded not in the
superior quality of the decisions resulting from judicial review but
in the willingness to hear individual grievances, consider their
soundness, address these grievances in good faith, and act in
accordance with the outcomes of the deliberation" (p. 2), namely,
"to reconsider decisions on the basis of the deliberation" (pp. 8,
134). For Harel "judicial review is (nothing but) a hearing to
which individuals have a right" (pp. 8, 133, 134). Thus, judicial
review is not valuable because of the superior quality of decisions
rendered by judges, the superior ability or willingness of judges to
protect rights, the special deliberative powers of judges or the
greater stability and coherence of judicial decision (p. 192). It is
only or mainly valuable as an application of the right to a hearing.
Even if we subscribe to the view that judicial review is only
valuable as an application of the right to a hearing, it does not
follow that we are in fact making a non-instrumentalist argument
for judicial review. Hearing individual grievances in good faith is
not valuable as such. It is merely or mostly a means to an end, and
the end is making the right decision. Within the context of judicial
review, hearing grievances is almost pointless if it does not
improve the quality of the decisions resulting from the review
process. If hearing grievances is all that matters and if it is valuable
as such, individuals could present their grievances to any public
officer even if he or she does not have the authority to amend or
abolish the statute (or administrative decision) that violated a
person's rights. Instead of having courts which have the authority
to review, amend and abolish statutes (or administrative
decisions), we could have a governmental "department of
grievances" which merely hears grievances from individuals and
conveys them to other governmental departrnents or the
legislature for future reference and general interest. But even
Harel agrees that the hearing process requires the state agent to
act in accordance with the outcomes of the deliberation, i.e., "to
reconsider decisions on the basis of the deliberation" (pp. 8, 134).
Also, reading Harel's discussion of the right to a hearing within
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the context of judicial review leads to a conclusion that Harel
implicitly admits that a hearing itself is a means to an end. What
would be the point of the hearing process and the right to a
hearing if it did not allow (and in fact require) the state agents to
reconsider their decisions in order to make better ones or right
ones? Being so, the right to a hearing cannot be "valuable as such"
and cannot form a non-instrumentalist argument for judicial
review. Harel insists that "judicial review is not a means for
protecting the right to a hearing; it is, in reality, its institutional
embodiment" (p. 202). This is slightly confusing, as Harel
immediately adds that "judicial review is designed to facilitate the
voicing of grievances by protecting the right to a hearing" (p. 202).
So perhaps judicial review is a means for protecting the right to a
hearing after all. Moreover, even if we agree that judicial review
is not a means for protecting the right to a hearing, but rather its
institutional embodiment, we cannot escape the conclusion that
this institutional embodiment is a means to an end after all-a
mechanism for improving decisionmaking.
Moreover, if a hearing is all that matters, there is little point
in allowing standing to those who were already heard before the
legislature made its decision. If an individual- perhaps also
through his representatives- has already been heard before the
decision was made, and if the hearing is all that matters, what
would be the point of hearing him again after the decision has
been made? The point of hearing him again is to allow one
institution (court of law) to apply legal procedure Uudicial
review) in order to amend or abolish a wrong decision that was
made by another institution and to get it right.
The right to hearing is a procedural right. Procedural rights
may have various rationales. They may secure fairness and
transparency; they may enable participation in the
decisionmaking process; they allow the decisionmakers to be
provided with all the relevant information -and the list goes on.
But eventually it comes down to enabling the legislature, the
administrative authority or the courts to make the right decisions.
These "right" decisions can be right from various perspectives.
They may promote efficacy, reflect the legislature's intent,
promote the common good, ensure appropriate protection of
rights and interests, and so on. Regardless of how we decide what
a right decision is or may be, procedural rights have little value
unless they enable decisionmakers to make the right decision. I
do not deny that the right to a hearing (much like other
procedural rights) does have some independent value regardless
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of the merit of the decision likely to result at the end of the
process. But this independent value is very limited and secondary
to the main purpose of procedural rights, which is enhancing the
probability that the resulting decision will be right, reasonable, or
at least better.
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHOUT COURTS?
Harel argues that "judicial review is not a practice which
must be conducted by courts of judges" and that "it is the process
of adjudication that renders the practice valuable; rather than the
fact that it is conducted by courts or judges" (pp. 8, 213).
Harel is probably too hasty here. First, and this is the point
made above, the process of adjudication, which, as Harel argues,
is equated with a process of hearing, is not valuable as such. It is
valuable mainly as a means to an end. The end is making the right
decision. The means is a process of hearing/adjudication.
Secondly, and more importantly, Harel is too quick to dismiss the
necessity of courts and judges. For a process of adjudication or
hearing to be conducted appropriately and in good faith- and as
a process of "review"- an independent third party is required.
This third party (the adjudicator or arbitrator) has to be
personally and institutionally independent of both the state's
organs (especially those who made the original decision) and the
litigant-individual. For the adjudication process and its results to
be fair, consistent and equal they have to rely on the adjudicator's
best and honest understanding of the law rather than on his
personal perception of justice. In other words, the adjudication
process has to be conducted by a court of law-or by any other
institution that goes by whatever name that will be institutionally
identical to what we know as "courts of law." Independent, biasfree and law-obeying institutions, which also have the authority to
overrule decisions of the state's organs, are a necessary
precondition for a proper process of hearing to take place. Harel
therefore is probably wrong to argue that "it is the process of
adjudication that renders the practice valuable; rather than the
fact that it is conducted by courts or judges" (p. 8), as the latter is
a necessary precondition of the former. Harellater admits that "to
the extent that other institutions can conduct a hearing, it is only
because they operate in a judicial manner and thereby
functionally become courts" (pp. 212, 214). It is not clear,
however, why Harel thinks that "in principle, the right to a
hearing can be protected by any institution, including perhaps the
legislature" (p. 214). Adjudication, "constitutional" hearing,
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judges and courts (properly understood) are intertwined as one
assumes the existence of the others. This means that judicial
review is a practice that must be conducted by courts and judges
after all.
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
Harel accurately presents the current state of affairs in the
common political and constitutional theory discourse (p. 135):
advocates of constitutionalism and rights-based judicial review
rely only on instrumentalist arguments according to which
constitutionalism and judicial review are justified because (or as
long as) they bring about better protection of human rights. A
similar instrumentalist argument would be that constitutionalism
and especially judicial review are justified because they are likely
to bring about better protection of human rights. Critics of
constitutionalism and rights-based judicial review use both
instrumentalist arguments (by stressing the superior quality of
legislative decisions) and non-instrumentalist arguments (by
describing constitutionalism and judicial review as "antidemocratic" and thus illegitimate). Harel concludes that by
ignoring non-instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism and
judicial review, their advocates "fight with one hand tied behind
their back" (p. 135). Harel's mission is therefore to add noninstrumentalist arguments to the arsenal of arguments favoring
constitutionalism and by that to "level the field in constitutional
theory" (p. 135).
The non-instrumentalist, legitimacy-based argument against
constitutionalism and judicial review could have been troubling
for advocates of constitutionalism (who do not use noninstrumentalist arguments) if it were a convincing or even a valid
one. The non-instrumentalist, legitimacy-based argument against
constitutionalism is, however, an extremely weak, unconvincing
argument. As will be explained shortly, it relies on myths and
imaginary facts. Thus there is no unlevelled field in constitutional
theory that needs to be levelled. The need to add noninstrumentalist arguments to the arsenal of arguments favoring
constitutionalism would have been an urgent and essential need
only if advocates of constitutionalism in fact thought that there
are powerful non-instrumentalist, legitimacy-based arguments
against constitutionalism, arguments that cannot be refuted
easily. This is, however, not the case. As this is a book review
rather than a book, I am not able to establish this argument in full.
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I will therefore limit the following discussion to a list of pressure
points.
The core of the non-instrumentalist, legitimacy-based
argument against constitutionalism and judicial review is that they
are "anti-democratic." This argument focuses on the countermajoritarian difficulty, which is one of the tnost common
problems in constitutional theory. According to the countermajoritarian argument, there is a problem with the legitimacy of
the institution of judicial review and with constitutional
entrenchment of rights. It is "anti-democratic" when unelected
judges use the power of judicial review to nullify the actions of
elected legislators, while interpreting a constitution that can
hardly be amended. The court, so it is argued, acts contrary to the
majority will as expressed by representative institutions. There
are numerous ways to answer this counter-majoritarian argument.
I will present, very briefly, only some of them, and will conclude
by suggesting my own response.
Firstly, one can hold the "discrete and insular minorities"
doctrine, according to which there are groups that are excluded
from the give-and-take of democratic politics. These groups are
almost always the losers in the democratic process and should be
protected from certain decisions of the majority. Therefore,
judicial review is legitimate only when it serves to protect the
rights of "discrete and insular minorities" against oppressive
actions by democratic majorities. John Hart Ely's "procedural
rights theory" falls neatly within this instrumentalist argument for
judicial review.' This approach, however, offers too narrow a
protection of human rights. For that reason (and for other reasons
that will not be elaborated here), it does not provide a satisfactory
reply to the anti-majoritarian argument.
Secondly, one can argue, much like Bruce Ackerman, that
judicial review is actually a democratic institution that checks the
anti-democratic actions of elected officials.4 Ackerman
distinguishes between "ordinary politics" and "constitutional
politics." He then adds that for various reasons, "the people" do
not really get involved in ordinary politics. Therefore, ordinary
politics are not really very democratic. Things are quite different
regarding "constitutional politics." Here, "the people" normally
become more engaged in the relevant issues and by expressing its
3.
REVIEW

4.

See

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

157 (19XO).

See, e.g.,

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS

lJ--13 (1991 ).

2015]

BOOK REVIEWS

657

wishes through the constitutional level, the majority commands
its representatives to act in accordance with its clear wishes. The
courts are merely enforcing the majority will by subordinating
"ordinary politics" to "constitutional politics." The part of
Ackerman's theory that stresses the difficulty with "ordinary
politics" has its appeal. I suspect that Ackerman's "constitutional
moments" answer does not solve the counter-majoritarian
difficulty in a satisfactory way, yet I will not discuss this point here.
Thirdly, one can admit that judicial review is anti-democratic
but add that there are some values (liberty, equality, some moral
imperatives and the like) that trump democratic legitimacy.
Therefore, judicial review is indeed anti-democratic but at the
same time justified when it protects these values (p. 141 ). This
approach, which has a certain appeal, is explicitly refuted by
Harel.
Fourthly, and this is the argument suggested by Harel, it can
be argued that some decisions about human rights are not the type
of decisions that should be made by the public or by the majority
(through its representatives) to begin with. Thus, there is no
"democratic loss" that needs to be justified, as some decisions
about human rights are by their nature beyond the jurisdiction of
"the people". This is a very interesting argument that may offer a
sound response to the anti-majoritarian argument. I am afraid,
however, that Harel does not fully explain and does not set clear
criteria as to why exactly some decisions are beyond the
jurisdiction of the democratic legislature-or indeed "the
people."
Harel gives the example of his owing $100 to John. Harel
argues that should he refuse to pay his debt, the dispute should
not be decided by democratic deliberation. Moreover, Harel
argues that in this case we should not strike a balance between
John's right to the money (or his claim that such a right exists) and
the procedural rights of citizens to political participation -as in
this case there is no right to political participation to begin with
(at least not on fairness or neutrality grounds). This is so because
John's claim, Harel argues, "hinges only on the substantive merit
of his claim" (p. 142) rather than on a vote or a referendum or any
other procedure. In other words, John's right to the $100 "is not
conditional on anybody's good will or preference or judgment"
(p. 142). But what makes the courts-or perhaps other institutions
that do not reflect the majority will- better at adjudicating such a
dispute? Harel's answer is that considerations of neutrality and
fairness are irrelevant here (or merely insufficient). All that
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matters is that the institution that adjudicates such cases will be
an embodiment of reason- and that the dispute will be decided
by using reason (p. 143). This innovative approach gives rise to a
few troubling questions. First, it is not quite clear what Harel
means by "reason"- what would be the alternatives for acting
upon reason (within the political-legal context)? Secondly, it is
not clear whether there is a difference between acting upon
reason and applying the law. Put differently, it is not clear whether
decisions about rights should be made in accordance with
"reason" or in accordance with the law. Thirdly, J-Iarel does not
explicitly say which institution is more likely to act upon reasonand how are we to ensure that it would do so. Fourthly, and
despite the third point above, it is implied that disputes about
rights should be decided by courts and not by democratic
deliberation. If this is so, Harel is in fact making what appears to
be an instrumentalist argument, which goes as follows: the only
way to make the right decision in cases involving disputes about
rights is to use "reason"; courts are more likely to use reason when
deciding such cases; therefore, courts are more likelly to get it right
when disputes about rights are decided; thus, courts should
adjudicate such cases. This is in fact an instrumentalist argument
for rights-based judicial review. Moreover, if courts are the
appropriate forum for deciding disputes about rights because they
are superior in their deliberative powers (as they are more
qualified and more likely to act upon reason), it may raise dignitybased concerns as this approach is based on a distrust of people's
normative judgments. Hare] himself refers to these concerns as a
drawback of instrumentalist arguments for judicial review. He
argues that these concerns result only from instrumentalist
arguments for judicial review (or constitutionalisrnt). My worry is
that these concerns result from Harel's approach as well, probably
because it is an instrumentalist approach after all. 5
Thus far I have discussed three common replies to the
"counter-majoritarian" argument against constitutionalism and
judicial review- and a fourth and innovative one which was
suggested by Harel. In the following I wish to offer a fifth reply
which is absent from the current political and constitutional
theory discourse and was not mentioned in Harel's book either.

5. I suspect that the concerns ahout distrusting people's normative judgments
should he ignored, as most people arc ignorant and lack sufficient knowledge and ability
to make proper normative judgments, hut since Harcl takes these concerns seriously I am
assuming, for the sake of argument, that he is right in doing so.
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My proposed response to the counter-majoritarian difficulty
is that it should be admitted that judicial review is, by and large,
anti-democratic, in the sense that judges do not necessarily act
according to the majority will. However, and for numerous
reasons, we should also admit that the legislature and "democratic
deliberation" also do not and often cannot reflect the majority
will, either accurately, remotely or at all. The countermajoritarian argument applies both to the judiciary and to the
legislature- and to a similar extent. Therefore, various
instrumentalist arguments can be brought against judicial review
and in favor of legislative supremacy. The counter-majoritarian
argument, however, as a legitimacy-based argument (which may
be a non-instrumentalist argument) cannot really be an argument
against judicial review and for legislative supremacy, since this is
an argument against both judicial review and legislative
supremacy (or legitimacy).
Jeremy Waldron, a prominent champion of anticonstitutionalism and anti-judicial review, asserts that opting for
6
judicial review results in a loss for democracy. It would seem that
the idea at the basis of this claim is that being unable to participate
in a decision about rights undermines the political equality that is
fundamental to democracy. Thus, the choice, as Waldron presents
it, is between letting the elected representatives of the people who
occupy the legislature make the final decisions on rights and
letting the unelected "judicial aristocracy" make the ultimate
decisions. We are encouraged to regard the choice in favor of the
legislature as resulting in no loss of government by the people, and
the choice in favor of judicial review as occasioning a significant
loss.
However, there is a significant loss for self-government in the
choice of a representative democracy itself. Martin Loughlin
rightly writes that a representative democracy
establishes a form of government far removed from the notion
of democracy as collective self-government .... Governments
of a modern representative democratic character do not in any
strict sense express the popular will. Although they elect
representatives, the people do not govern, even in the indirect
sense of choosing individuals who will assemble to put their will
into action. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that the
6. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 10-17,211-312 (1999). See
generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13
OxrORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1X (1993).
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people merely select from amongst the competitors those who
7
will take the political decisions.

When reading Waldron's work in this area, one is left with
the sense that whenever disagreements about rights arise we are
choosing between a system where a particular citizen goes out and
casts a vote in favor of or against a particular condusion and a
system in which a group of judges makes the decision for him.
What Loughlin's point makes us realize it that even when the
legislature is deciding, someone else is deciding for that particular
citizen. The notion that democracy is in fact a myth is not new. It
was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who said that "If we take the term in
the strict sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there
never will be. ,x He also added that "The people of England
regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only
during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are
1
elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing. "' Even though
Rousseau wrote this at a certain time in a certain place, the core
of his arguments (which will not be elaborated here) is universally
valid.
Thus, to present the argument as though judicial review is the
only choice that results in a loss of self-government is incorrect.
This point needs further elaboration, yet I will not try to explain
in full why democracy does not exist and cannot exist. In the
following I will describe in a nutshell three well-known reasons
(out of 15 I have identified to date- and my research is not over
yet) why modern representative democracy results in a loss of
democracy, in the sense that it fails, at times significantly, to
reflect the idea of collective self-government. The reasons are
first, a lack of real choice; second, the need to form a political
coalition; and third, the complete distortion of the majority will
caused by non-proportional voting systems.
As to a lack of real choice: all too often citizens do not have
a real choice when they elect their representatives. This is the case
when the voter can only choose between a few political parties or
candidates. This is the case, for example, in the U.S.A. (where
normally only two political parties are represented in the federal

7. Martin Loughlin, Rights, Democracy, and l~aw, in SCEIPTICAL ESSAYS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 41,51 (Tom Camphcll, K.D. Ewing & Adam Tomkins cds., 2001).
X. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL RIGHT III, at ch.4 ( 1762), available at https://chooks.adclaidc.cdu.au/r/
rousscau/j can_j acq ucs/rXMs/hook3. h tm l#scction27.
9. !d. at ch.15.
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legislature), the U.K. (normally three to five parties) and Canada
(normally four parties).
Generally speaking, we have a real choice which enables us
to express and realize our preferences when we have an adequate
number of valuable options. When we only have a handful of
parties or candidates to choose from, and especially when some
or most of them are not perceived by us as "valuable options," we
normally do not have a real choice, and therefore are not able to
express our true will by choosing one of them. In the lJ .S.A., to
take one clear example, there are normally only two political
parties and two candidates for President. In this case, when a
voter's views do not match in a satisfactory way the political
agenda of either of these parties, this voter has little or almost no
real political choice. How should a voter vote when he supports
compulsory health insurance but opposes same-sex marriage?
How should a voter vote when she supports hard-core capitalism
and the idea of small government but also supports abortion on
demand?
This lack of choice makes it harder to argue that the elected
body represents in any meaningful way the majority will. The
problem, however, is that having a great number of political
parties does not necessarily increase self-government and
accordingly does not decrease the democratic loss. This leads us
to the second reason for why democracy cannot exist.
As to proportional voting systems and the necessity to form
a political coalition: in political systems where parliament consists
of a large number of political parties, a coalition of a few parties
may be required in order to form a stable government. This is the
case, for example, in France, Italy, and especially in Israel, where
we can find around 10 political parties represented in parliament
and 4-6 political parties forming a coalition government. Alas,
those who vote for a certain political party cannot always predict
who its associates in a future coalition would be, and consequently
cannot always predict which political principles will guide this
coalition. Such a political system can offer more choice at the time
of the election. But once the election is over and decisions are
made concerning the compromises that should be made in order
to form a coalition of political parties, the will of the majority is
set aside, at least to a certain extent.
Moreover, in a political regime of a coalition of parties, a
counter-majoritarian problem within the legislature is almost
inevitable. This is so because in a system of political coalition,
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small political parties that are part of the leading coalition of
parties enjoy great political influence, which is highly
disproportionate to the number of votes they received. In these
cases, the majority will (if there is any) is not just being ignored,
at least in part, but is being replaced by the will of several
minorities, which, at times, runs against the clear interests of the
majority itself.
As to non-proportional voting systems and the complete
distortion of the majority will: non-proportional voting systems,
such as majoritarian voting systems, winner-takes-all voting
systems (in cases when there are several constituencies) and
mixed voting systems normally completely fail to reflect the
majority will.
In the U.K., for example, in almost all cases in the twentieth
century in which one political party won more than 50o/o of seats
in parliament, this party did not receive more than 50°/o of the
people's votes. In other words, a single political party normally
gains almost ultimate control on the executive and legislative
branches, while being opposed by the majority of voters. In Italy,
after the 2008 election, Berlusconi's coalition won 47°/o of the
people's votes but 54o/o of seats in the legislature. In France, after
the 2007 election, Nicolas Sarkozy's party won 39o/o of the
people's votes but 54°/o of seats in parliament. In Canada, in the
2011 election, the conservative party won 40o/o of the people's
votes but 54 o/o of seats in Parliament. In the U.S.A., in the 2000
elections, Al Gore won more than 51 million votes but lost the
presidency to George Bush who won less than 50.5 million votes
(with Ralph Nader winning almost 3 million votes--most of which
would have been given to Gore had Nader not run for the
presidency). These are not rare examples but representative ones.
More generally, in non-proportional voting systems, there is
normally no correlation between the percentage of votes a
political party gets and the number of seats in parliament to which
the same party is entitled- and smaller parties are systematically
adversely affected. In the U.K., to take only one illustrative
example, the Liberal Democrat party has been consistently
under-represented in Parliament in a way that completely
diminishes the "democratic" nature of the election . In 1974 and in
1992, for example, the Liberal Democrat party won 18°/o of the
votes but less than 2o/o of seats in Parliament. In 2010 they won
23°/o of the votes but less than 9o/o of seats in Parliament.
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In the 2015 election, the gap between U.K.'s self-perception
as a democracy and the facts was truly astonishing. To take a few
examples: the Labour Party increased its share of the votes by
1.5°/o but lost 26 seats in Parliament; the SNP got 4.7o/o of votes
and 56 seats. The Liberal-Democrats got 7.9°/o of votes but only 8
seats; and UKIP got 12.6o/o of the votes but only 1 seat. It is quite
obvious that in majoritarian, anti-democratic voting systems,
gaining popular support is one thing and gaining seats in the
legislature is another thing. More generally, it is not clear how
political systems that employ a non-proportional voting system
can seriously discuss the majority will as a justification for
rejecting constitutionalism or judicial review on both legislative
and administrative decisions.
These are just a few reasons- and there are many morewhy democracy does not exist and cannot exist. In light of the
above incomplete, simplistic, yet clear evidence of how the
majority will is being significantly and institutionally distorted in
all "democracies," the academic discourse about "democratic
legitimacy," the majority will, and the democratic supremacy of
Parliament is completely meaningless, as it is based on myths and
fabricated assumptions.
One quick warning is required here: we should be careful not
to equate free elections and public legitimacy (which may result
from ignorance or brainwashing) with democracy. "The people"
may be happy with rolling a dice or flipping a coin as a voting or
decisionmaking system. These systems may enjoy public
legitimacy- but they will not be democratic in any meaningful
sense-in the same way that one's autonomous decision to
completely waive one's autonomy and to unquestionably obey an
authority does not mean that that person is now autonomous. For
a voting system to be democratic, it is not sufficient that it enjoys
public legitimacy. For a voting system to be democratic, its results
should reflect as accurately as possible the genuine preferences of
voters.
Since no representative democracy- or any other type of
democracy-can truly or even remotely reflect the majority will,
the counter-majoritarian argument or the argument about
"democratic
deliberation"
cannot
be
used
against
constitutionalism and judicial review. And since noninstrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism and judicial
review have very limited power, then in the battlefield of
arguments for and against constitutionalism and judicial review it
is instrumentalist arguments who decide who wins. Harel is right
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to argue that instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism and
judicial review have their flaws, but it does not follow that there
are better, non-instrumentalist arguments that can overcome
these flaws. It is possible that, for better or for worse,
instrumentalist arguments are all we have for (and against)
judicial review.
CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR MOI)EST
CONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTALISM
Harel's purpose in his book is not to replace all
instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalisrrt and judicial
review with non-instrumentalist arguments. Harel does suggest,
however,
that
some
instrumentalist
arguments
for
constitutionalism and judicial review are not as strong as they
appear to be, and that sometimes non-instrumentalist arguments
complement instrumentalist ones, are superior to them, or even
are the only ones that can truly explain the nature and importance
of constitutionalism and judicial review. The argument that
constitutionalism and judicial review are not merely means for
protecting rights and promoting justice but are also valuable as
such-can be quite powerful. However, in some parts of the book
it seems that Harel's dismissal of instrumentalist arguments is too
quick and too broad, and, accordingly, the weight that he accords
to non-instrumentalist arguments is probably too excessive, as
they are not always free of difficulties.
To take one example, in his attack on constitutional
instrumentalism Harel argues that it rests on factual speculations
that cannot be substantiated and that it suffers frorrt inauthenticity
or insincerity (pp. 4, 135). The argument about constitutional
instrumentalism resting on factual speculations can be answered
in the following way. It can be argued that constitutional
instrumentalism does not necessarily mean that, for example,
constitutionalism and judicial review are desirable because they
always bring about good or better results in terms of protecting
rights and public goods. Constitutional instrmnentalism may
mean that constitutionalism and judicial review are desirable as
long as they bring about better results and to the extent that they
do that. This way we avoid factual speculations. We also avoid the
difficulty of making broad generalizations while ignoring social,
political and legal circumstances that are time- and placesensitive. Presumably we can be a bit bolder, and argue that
constitutionalism and judicial review are desirable because they
increase the likelihood that human rights and public goods will be
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better protected, simply because they put limits on the power of
the executive and the legislature, and because usually power
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Thus the
(intrinsic?) value of constitutionalism and judicial review lies
within the good old doctrine of the separation of powers in its
modern form of "checks and balances." Constitutions and judicial
review put limits on the power of the legislature and the executive.
In some cases these limits may prevent the legislature and the
executive from doing the right thing, but in the long run and on
the whole it is better for citizens to live in a state in which the most
dangerous branches (the legislature and the executive) are being
restrained by constitutionalism and judicial review. This is so
because usually power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely, and because constitutionalism and rights-based
judicial review do not accord absolute power to the courts,
whereas the lack of a binding constitution and judicial review
results in nearly absolute legislative and executive power. We do
not really need social science research to successfully substantiate
this statement. Common sense as well as recent and not-so-recent
history will do.
As to the problem of inauthenticity or insincerity, I am afraid
that Harel's non-instrumentalist arguments are also not free from
this difficulty. Harel's argument that constitutions and judicial
review are valuable as such, relies in part on factual speculations.
Harel argues that his purpose is to "identify justifications which
meet the test of sincerity, namely that address the genuine
sentiments underlying the popular support of political institutions
and procedures, rather than to rationalize these institutions and
procedures in terms that are alien to those who establish the
institutions and sustain them" (pp. 4-5). Harel then assumes that
the value of constitutions as the public acknowledgment of the
duty to protect rights and the value of judicial review as the
institutional embodiment of the right to a hearing accurately
capture popular sensibilities.
There are some huge factual assumptions here that call into
question the authenticity of Harel's approach. Harel assumes that
both current popular support of political institutions and
procedures-and the state of mind of those who established and
sustain these institutions and procedures-rely, in whole or in
part, on non-instrumentalist arguments. There is no evidence to
support these assumptions. These assumptions may or may not be
reasonable, but they are assumptions and speculations
nevertheless. Harel may offer a compelling way to understand the
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true nature or rationale of some political institutions and
procedures, regardless of whether this way is shared by others.
But as compelling as this way may be, it does not follow that it is
shared by the public or by state officials.
In conclusion, the importance of Harel's book is twofold.
First, it offers important, exciting, and innovative noninstrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism and judicial
review, and it does so in a clear, engaging and captivating way.
Second, while I have doubts as to whether Harel's noninstrumentalist
arguments
outweigh
sorne
relevant
instrumentalist arguments, they do give rise to doubts with regard
to the soundness of some common relevant instrumentalist
arguments. These doubts call for modesty, coherence, and
sincerity when instrumentalist approaches are applied to support
constitutional procedures and institutions. Too many
instrumentalist arguments in the common discourse about
constitutionalism and judicial review attempt to establish that
constitutions and judicial review always result in better protection
of rights, public goods or democratic principles, and that is what
makes them valuable. A more modest and defensible line of
argument would be that constitutionalism and judicial review are
valuable because they are likely to better protect rights, public
goods or democratic principles, and to an extent they actually do
so. Much like the law, the rule of law, autonomy, and life itself,
constitutions and judicial review are means to an end (doing good
or promoting justice), and are only or mainly valuable to the
extent that they achieve that end. Their success depends on
changeable circumstances and is time- and place-sensitive. This
modest instrumentalism is perhaps not very exciting, but is
probably the best way to understand the value of
constitutionalism- and its limits.

